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Abstract: 
Dynamic relations during the preschool years across processes of control and understanding in 
the domains of emotion and cognition were examined. Participants were 263 children (42% non-
White) and their mothers who were seen first when the children were 3 years old and again when 
they were 4. Results indicated dynamic dependence among the processes studied. Specifically, 
change in cognitive processes of control and understanding were dependent upon initial levels of 
the other processes. Changes in emotion control and understanding were not predicted by earlier 
performance in the other processes. Findings are discussed with regard to the constructs of 
control and understanding and the developmental interrelations among emotion and cognitive 
processes. 
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Article: 
Although there is growing recognition that examination of the interconnections between emotion 
and cognition processes in early childhood is likely to lead to increased understanding of 
children’s development (Blair & Diamond, 2008; Gray, 2004), much research continues to treat 
the domains of emotion and cognition separately. As a result, we do not yet fully understand the 
developmental processes by which emotion and cognition mutually influence each other. 
There is evidence from recent work in neuroscience that processes of emotion and cognition are 
closely related in the brain. The anterior attention system appears to play a functional role in the 
control of attention and in the regulation of both emotion and cognition (Davidson, Putnam, & 
Larson, 2000; Davis, Bruce, & Gunnar, 2002). Guiding this system is the anterior cingulate 
cortex, which includes two major subdivisions, one of which governs cognitive and attentional 
processes and the second of which governs emotional processes. It is thought that these two 
subdivisions have a reciprocal, or two-way, relation (Davidson et al., 2000; Davis et al., 2002), 
suggesting a biological foundation for the developmental integration of specific types of control 
and understanding processes within the domains of emotion and cognition during early 
childhood. The present research investigates the behavioral manifestations of these control and 
understanding processes early in development to identify dynamic relations between them that 
account for individual differences in patterns of change. 
The theoretical framework of the work described here focuses on two general processes—control 
and understanding—that we define as operating in both domains—emotion and cognition. We 
have chosen to use the terms control and understanding to emphasize the similarities within 
these processes across domains. We use control to refer to processes of regulation, both the 
regulation of affect and of attention and executive function, and understanding to refer to 
cognitive, metacognitive, and metaemotion knowledge. Researchers focusing on emotional 
development typically use the term emotion regulation to describe what we label emotion 
control, and researchers focusing on cognitive development use the term executive function to 
describe what we label cognitive control. Similarly, our category of emotion understanding is 
labeled emotion knowledge by emotion researchers, and our category of cognitive 
understanding is labeled theory of mind. By using the same terms across the two domains, we 
emphasize their similarity as developmental processes. 
Our approach to studying control and understanding processes across the domains of emotion 
and cognition has been tested and replicated in two samples of 3-year-old children: a diverse 
group of 141 children (Leerkes, Paradise, O’Brien, Calkins, & Lange, 2008) and the 3-year-old 
children included in the present study (Blankson, O’Brien, Leerkes, Marcovitch, & Calkins, 
2012). In both cases, the four-component model, differentiating control and understanding across 
both emotion and cognition, was more descriptive of the relations among variables than either a 
model collapsing across processes within the domains of emotion and cognition or a model 
collapsing across domains but distinguishing control and understanding processes. These prior 
analyses were cross-sectional, however, and do not answer questions regarding the 
developmental associations across processes or domains. The present analyses go beyond this 
earlier work to address the extent to which age 3 performance within each component process is 
associated with change over time in each of the other three processes. 
The present study is the first longitudinal examination of all four processes in the same sample of 
children across the preschool period, the time when some of these skills can first be measured. 
All of the processes studied in this project have been examined extensively in prior research, 
however, and some investigations have included longitudinal relations among the constructs of 
interest. These prior findings are briefly reviewed here. 
Processes of Control and Interrelations Across Domains 
Within the preschool period, we define emotion control to be the appropriate expression, use, 
and inhibition of emotion that allows a child to cope with positive and negative emotional, 
cognitive, and social situations (Calkins & Fox, 2002). We define cognitive control as the use of 
executive skills: working memory, or the ability to hold multiple pieces of information in mind 
and manipulate this information, and cognitive inhibitory control, an ability that allows a child to 
resist disruptive influences of competing stimuli (Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004). 
Some researchers consider children’s emotion control abilities to be foundational to other 
domains of development (Eisenberg et al., 1995) and to play a key role in the regulation of state 
and of emotions and also in motor activity, attention, and cognition (Porges, 2003). Children who 
are better able to control their emotions have been found to be better able to engage in 
challenging tasks that provide opportunities for using and practicing cognitive skills (Calkins & 
Dedmon, 2000). Others have proposed that cognitive control, particularly attentional skills, aid in 
the development of emotion control (Calkins & Marcovitch, 2010; Posner & Rothbart, 2007). As 
attention becomes increasingly intentional throughout the 2nd and 3rd years of life, children can 
be seen to shift their attentional focus away from negative or emotionally arousing situations and 
also to deploy attention in problem-solving or cognitively demanding situations. Carlson and 
Wang (2007) outline three possible relations between cognitive control, specifically inhibitory 
control, and emotion control in early development: (a) inhibitory control underlies emotion 
regulation abilities, (b) emotion control allows more successful cognitive control, and (c) the two 
types of control are so closely integrated as to be virtually impossible to separate. The analyses 
in the present report allow an examination of all three of these possibilities. 
Processes of Understanding and Interrelations Across Domains 
We define emotion understanding as the ability to recognize and label one’s own and others’ 
emotions and tie them to situations, as well as the ability to understand the causes of emotions 
(Denham, 1998). We conceptualize cognitive understanding during the preschool period as a 
child’s ability to understand his or her own and others’ mental states (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 
2002) and an awareness that perceptions do not always accurately reflect reality. 
Several possibilities for the relation between emotion understanding and cognitive understanding 
have been raised in the literature. One is that emotion understanding emerges first and supports 
the development of theory of mind. Evidence indicates that very young children use emotion 
terms by age 2 and only later talk about beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Dunn (2000) has 
suggested that children first understand emotional states, which are typically accompanied by 
outward displays, and then extend that understanding to cognitive states, which are not usually 
visible. An alternative longitudinal hypothesis is that children need to develop an understanding 
of mental states to identify others’ emotional states. Harwood and Farrar (2006) suggest that 
affective perspective taking performance, particularly the identification of emotions in others that 
differ from one’s own feelings in those situations, depends upon the skills inherent in theory of 
mind tasks. In support of this idea, de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, and Morrell (2004) identified a lag 
between children’s understanding of false belief and their ability to attribute emotions accurately. 
Similarly, Wellman and Liu (2004) found that children’s ability to understand that an individual 
can feel one emotion but display another develops after an initial understanding of one’s own 
and others’ minds is acquired. A third possibility is that children’s understanding of minds and of 
emotions develop in parallel; that is, the two areas of knowledge may be somewhat independent 
of each other. Support for this idea comes from studies in which children’s performance on 
theory of mind and emotion understanding tasks are uncorrelated (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 1999). 
In sum, there is a relative lack of consistent evidence regarding the developmental relation 
between emotion understanding and cognitive understanding. In the present study, we will 
examine all three possibilities: no predictive relation, emotion understanding predicts change in 
cognitive understanding, and cognitive understanding predicts change in emotion understanding. 
Interrelations Across Control and Understanding Processes 
Prior research examining developmental relations between control and understanding processes 
has typically focused within either the emotional or cognitive domain. The relations across 
various aspects of emotional competence, including emotion control and emotion understanding, 
have been the subject of several recent theoretical discussions (e.g., Izard et al., 2011), but there 
is still relatively little empirical research. It seems likely that children who are aware of their own 
and others’ emotional states are more likely to make efforts to regulate at least the display of 
emotions in some situations. Using an attachment framework, Waters et al. (2010) found 
children’s understanding of emotions to be related to their ability to handle negative 
emotions. Cole, Dennis, Smith-Simon, and Cohen (2009) found that children’s understanding of 
emotion regulation strategies was related to their self-regulatory behavior. 
A considerable body of research has examined relations between cognitive control, or executive 
function tasks, and cognitive understanding, or theory of mind. Perner and colleagues (Perner, 
1998; Perner & Lang, 1999) propose that metarepresentational abilities arise from the 
development of mental state understanding and that this ability is necessary for successful 
execution of cognitive control tasks. Conversely, Russell (1996; see also Carlson & Moses, 
2001) claims that children’s difficulties in understanding deception and false belief stem from 
shortcomings in the ability to exert cognitive control. Results of several studies that have 
examined these links longitudinally indicate that cognitive control skills predict later 
performance on mental state reasoning and understanding tasks (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 
2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). 
Little work has been done to link cognitive control with emotion understanding or emotion 
control with cognitive understanding. Some authors have proposed that cognitive control skills 
promote understanding of emotions and affective perspective taking (Denham, Zoller, & 
Couchoud, 1994; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). In the few studies in which cognitive control and 
emotion understanding tasks have been examined together, significant relations between tasks 
have been found (Hughes, Dunn, & White, 1998; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). Because these 
studies were cross-sectional, no direction of effects could be identified. One longitudinal study 
included measures of both emotion regulation in a frustration task and theory of mind tasks, with 
results indicating no relation between the two over the preschool years (Liebermann, Giesbrecht, 
& Müller, 2007). 
The Present Study 
The goal of this study is to examine the developmental, time-lagged interconnections between 
four processes—emotion control, cognitive control, emotion understanding, and cognitive 
understanding. We use longitudinal data collected when children were 3 and 4 years old and test 
dynamic models to identify the extent to which each process accounts for developmental change 
in the others. We first examined an overall model to determine whether dynamic relations exist 
among these four processes, that is, whether any of the component processes predicts change 
over time in any other process. These analyses were followed up with tests of alternative models 
to identify which specific processes predict, or are leading indicators of, the others, and which 
are lagging indicators, in that their development is related to earlier performance in other 
processes. Because there is relatively little literature examining the relations among all four of 
these processes longitudinally within the preschool period, we took an exploratory approach and 
tested all possible paths. Thus, we asked the question of whether each type of process—emotion 
control, cognitive control, emotion understanding, and cognitive understanding—predicted 
change in the other processes. The resulting investigation represents a unique approach to the 
examination of the development of and relations between and among these four processes in the 
early childhood years. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of two hundred and sixty-three 3-year-old children 
(M = 41.79 months, SD = 2.41, range = 37–47) and their mothers who participated in two waves 
of data collection of a study examining emotional and cognitive contributions to early school 
success. At the first wave, mothers were 33 years old on average (SD = 5.91). Approximately 
51% had a 4-year college degree, 74% were married and living with their partner, and 79% were 
employed. Average income-to-needs ratio was 2.89 (SD = 1.73); 37% of the sample had an 
income-to-needs ratio below 2, 53% between 2 and 5, and 10% greater than 5. Fifty-two percent 
of the children were female; 58% of the children were European American, 35% African 
American, and 7% other ethnicities, including children of mixed ethnicity. 
Of the 263 original participants, 244 returned 1 year later for Wave 2, a 93% retention rate. 
Mothers who participated in both visits were more likely to be White, 
χ2(1, N = 263) = 5.13, p < .05, and better educated, Welch’s t(261) = 3.14, p < .05, than those 
who did not return for follow-up. At age 4 (M = 53.41 months, SD = 1.84, range = 49–59 
months), 52% of the children were female; 60% of the children were European American, 32% 
African American, and 8% other ethnicities. Mothers were 34 years old on average (SD = 5.69). 
Approximately 53% had a 4-year college degree or had completed higher levels of education, 
74% were married and living with their partner, and 77% were employed. 
Procedure 
Participating families were recruited from preschools and child-care centers. When children were 
3 and again at age 4, they participated with their mothers in a laboratory session during which 
they were videotaped while completing tasks assessing emotional and cognitive control and 
understanding. The session included a snack and play time with the mother. Mothers provided 
written consent and completed questionnaires during each session. Families received $40 and 
$60 for the 3- and 4-year visits respectively, and children selected a toy. 
Measures 
We take a multimethod approach to measurement by assessing each construct with several 
different tasks. Composites were created by standardizing and summing the relevant scores for 
each construct within each time point. To retain the longitudinal structure of the data for 
analytical purposes, the 4-year variables were standardized using the means and standard 
deviations of the 3-year variables prior to summing. 
Emotion Control 
Emotion control was measured both by maternal report and by observed behavior. 
Mother report  Two measures of emotion control were completed by mothers: the Children’s 
Behavior Questionnaire short form (CBQ;Putnam & Rothbart, 2006) and the Emotion 
Regulation Checklist (ERC; Shields & Cicchetti, 1998). In the CBQ, mothers described their 
children’s typical reactions to various situations on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(extremely untrue of your child) to 7 (extremely true of your child). Of interest in the present 
analyses was the Falling Reactivity/Soothability subscale (6 items, alphas = .73 at 3 and 4 years), 
which indexes regulation. In the ERC, mothers rated how frequently their child engaged in 
certain behaviors on a scale from 1 (never) to 4 (always). Two subscales, Lability/Negativity (15 
items, alphas = .82 and .81 at 3 and 4 years) and Emotion Regulation (8 items, alphas = .60 and 
.56), were used in the present study. Higher scores represented more emotion control. The three 
parent-report measures were correlated .29 to .50 at age 3 and .29 to .55 at age 4, all ps < .01. 
Alphas for the composites were .67 at 3 and 4 years. 
Observed regulation  Expressed frustration and regulatory behaviors were coded from 
videotapes of frustration tasks: the Locked Box at 3 years (Calkins, 1997) and a frustrating 
puzzle task at 4 years. For the Locked Box task, an attractive toy was placed in a transparent box 
that was locked with a padlock. After ensuring that the child knew how to open a lock with a 
key, the experimenter supplied the child with a large ring of keys, none of which was the correct 
key. The experimenter then left the room while the child attempted to open the box. After 4 min, 
the experimenter re-entered and gave the child the correct key so the child could play with the 
toy. For the frustrating puzzle, the child was asked to untangle a string laced through a toy with 
many holes. The middle of the string was glued to the toy, thus making it impossible to untangle. 
The experimenter left the room while the child attempted to untangle the string. After 3 min, the 
experimenter re-entered the room, presented a second unglued puzzle to the child, and allowed 
the child to completely unlace the string. 
Videotapes of the tasks were rated by trained coders for: verbal frustration, or the frequency of 
verbal negative expressions of frustration such as “I don’t want to do this anymore” 
(reversed); physical frustration, or the frequency of physically negative expressions, such as 
hitting or throwing the box or puzzle (reversed); and global regulation, scored on a scale of 0 (no 
control of distress responses) to 3 (well-regulated control). Interrater reliabilities, calculated as 
Pearson correlations for verbal and physical frustration and kappa for global regulation on 
approximately 20% of the videotapes were .96, .95, and .71, respectively, at 3 years, and .97, .63, 
and .58 at 4 years. Scores for observed regulation correlated .23 to .45 at age 3 and .26 to .42 at 
age 4, all ps < .01. Alphas were .64 and .56 at 3 and 4 years. 
Cognitive Control 
Working memory  The number recall subtest of the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children 
(K–ABC, Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983), a forward digit span task, was administered. In this task, 
the examiner recites a series of numbers, and the child is asked to repeat them in the same 
sequence. Number sequences increase in size until children miss three in a row. The possible 
range of scores was 0–22. 
Inhibitory control  In the day/night Stroop test (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994), children 
were presented with a deck of cards, half of which were black with a yellow moon and several 
stars and half white with a bright sun, and were instructed to say “day” in response to the black 
cards and “night” to the white cards. Following 2 practice trials, each type of card was presented 
eight times in a fixed order. The child’s score was the number of correct responses to the 16 test 
trials. Children who failed both practice trials were not presented the test trials and received a 
score of 0 (3 year n = 76; 4 year n = 13). The possible range of scores was 0–16. 
The two cognitive control measures were correlated at both ages: 3 year, r(259) = .42; 
4 year, r(242) = .24, both ps < .01. Alphas for the composites were .48 and .38 at 3 and 4 years. 
Emotion Understanding 
Labeling of emotions  Children were presented four felt faces, depicting the emotions happy, 
sad, angry, and scared, and asked to name each expression (e.g., “How is this person feeling right 
now?”) to assess verbal emotion labeling (Denham, 1986). Children were also asked to point to 
each expression when requested (e.g., “Show me the _______ face”) to assess emotion 
recognition. For each emotion, children received a score of 2 if they identified the correct 
emotion, 1 if they identified an incorrect emotion of the correct valence (e.g., indicating sad 
instead of angry), and 0 if they identified an emotion of the incorrect valence (e.g., indicating 
happy for sad). Recognition and labeling scores were correlated: 3 year, r(261) = .62; 
4 year, r(244) = .42, both ps < .01, and were summed; scores could range from 0 to 16. 
Affective perspective taking  The vignettes of emotion-eliciting situations developed 
by Denham (1986) were used to assess children’s understanding of others’ emotions. Vignettes 
were presented as puppet tasks; the children were asked to indicate how the puppet felt by 
affixing a felt face depicting happiness, sadness, anger, or fear to the puppet. The first four 
vignettes involved situations that evoke nonequivocal emotional reactions (e.g., happiness at 
getting an ice cream cone). The remaining six vignettes were more equivocal situations where 
the protagonist puppet portrayed an emotional response that the mother had earlier reported was 
atypical for her child. For example, if a mother indicated that her child would feel scared about 
being approached by a large, friendly dog, the puppet enactedhappiness using standardized 
verbal and visual cues. For each vignette, children received a 0, 1, or 2 for the face they selected 
using the same criteria as the labeling of emotions scoring. The nonequivocal and equivocal 
scores correlated significantly: 3 year, r(258) = .53; 4 year, r(244) = .43, both ps < .01, and were 
summed; the possible range was 0–20. 
Knowledge of emotion causes  Children’s ability to explain the reasons for experiencing 
emotions was examined using a puppet task (Denham et al., 1994). One of four emotion faces 
(happiness, sadness, anger, or fear) was placed on a puppet, and children were asked to identify 
the emotion. Then the examiner asked, “What made the puppet feel this way?” Children were 
encouraged to report up to four reasons, and their responses were recorded verbatim and coded 
for the number of accurate, independent causes given (possible range 0–4) for each of the four 
emotions. Accuracy was defined using criteria established in past research (Barrett & Campos, 
1987; Stein & Jewett, 1986; e.g., correct causes of anger involve goal blockage). Interobserver 
reliabilities, calculated as kappas, were .76 and .83 for the 3- and 4-year assessments, 
respectively. The number of correct explanations was summed across all four emotions; scores 
could range from 0 to 16. 
The three emotion understanding tasks were correlated .46 to .49 at age 3 and .30 to .44 at age 4, 
all ps < .01. Alphas for the composites were .71 and .53 at 3 and 4 years. 
Cognitive Understanding 
Appearance–reality distinction  This task assesses whether children can accurately describe 
differences between an object’s real nature and its apparent nature when modified perceptually 
(Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983). Children were shown two realistic-looking imitation objects: a 
candle in the shape of an apple and an egg made of wood at 3 years, and a pencil sharpener in the 
shape of a light bulb and an eraser that looks like a crayon at 4 years. The child was asked what 
is the object really (control question) and what does it look like (test question; e.g., “Does it look 
like a candle or an apple?”). Then, the color was modified by placing a sheet of blue-tinted 
plastic in front of each of the objects, and the size was modified by using a large magnifying 
lens. The child was asked what the object looked like while modified (e.g., “Does it look blue or 
red?” or “Does it look big or does it look little?”) and what the properties of the objectreally were 
(e.g., “Is it really, really blue or is it really, really red?”or “Is it really, really big, or is it really, 
really little?”). Children scored 1 point if they responded correctly to both the appearance and the 
reality questions for a specific property. The number of correct responses was summed across 
both objects and all identity, color, and size domains to yield a total score that could range from 
0 to 6. 
Visual perspective taking  The measure of Visual Perspective Taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, 
& Flavell, 1981; Taylor, 1988) is organized hierarchically into Level 1 tasks, in which children 
need only recognize that another person cannot always see the same things they can see, and 
Level 2 tasks, which require children to differentiate their own from another person’s viewpoint. 
Children were first presented with three Level 2 tasks in which two different pictures and a book 
were placed on the table in front of the child one at a time. Children were asked two questions 
about each stimulus that required them to consider their own perspective and that of the 
experimenter. Following these tasks, one Level 1 task was administered in which children were 
shown a card with a different picture on each side. The card was then placed vertically between 
the child and the experimenter so that each could see only one side. Children were asked to 
identify what they could see from their own perspective and what the experimenter could see. 
Children earned 1 point for each correct response; scores could range from 0 to 7. 
Unexpected contents  This task assessed children’s ability to identify accurate and false beliefs 
about the contents of two containers (Astington & Gopnik, 1988; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 
1987). At 3 years, the child was shown a BAND-AID box that contained blocks and a crayon 
box that contained spoons. At 4 years, the child was shown a cereal box containing pencils and a 
bubble jar containing straws. First, the examiner presented the box and asked the child, “What do 
you think is in here?” The examiner then revealed the actual contents. Children were then asked 
two test questions: “Before we opened this, what did you think was in here?” and what a friend, 
who had not seen the actual contents of the box, would think was inside. Children earned a score 
of 1 for each correct answer summed across both containers; possible scores ranged from 0 to 4. 
Unexpected location  The unexpected location task involved asking the child to predict a 
person’s behavior based on a mistaken belief about the location of a hidden object (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Hala & Chandler, 1996). The experimenter showed the child three 
boxes. A second experimenter then entered the room, placed a toy in one of the three boxes, and 
left the room. The child was asked to move the object from one box to another while 
Experimenter 2 was out of the room. Two trials were presented and for each trial the child was 
asked two test questions: “Where will E2 look for the toy when he comes back?” and “Where 
will E2 think the toy is?” Two control questions (“Where did E2 put the toy?” and “Where is the 
toy really?”) were also asked; children received 1 point for each correct test question if they 
answered both control questions correctly. The number of correct responses to the test questions 
across both trials was summed; scores could range from 0 to 4. 
The cognitive understanding tasks correlated .14 to .30 at age 3 and .34 to .44 at age 4, 
all ps < .05. Alphas for the composites were .50 and .71 at 3 and 4 years. 
Child age and language  At age 3, children were administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT; Dunn & Dunn, 1997). Child language was considered as a potential covariate along 
with child age at Time 1. 
Data Analysis 
The primary analytic approach was latent difference score regression models (LDS; Ferrer & 
McArdle, 2004; McArdle, 2009), with child age and child language considered as covariates. In 
an LDS model, the change between two variables is represented by a latent factor that is defined 
as the difference between the other two variables through the use of fixed unit-valued (= 1) 
coefficients (McArdle, 2009). Combining multiple univariate LDS models into one model allows 
tests of developmental interconnections among the variables. A complete multivariate model in 
which change in each variable is predicted from initial levels of all other variables can be 
specified and tested to provide indication of the extent to which variables are dynamically 
interdependent. Nested models can also be specified and compared with the complete 
multivariate model to provide further information about the extent to which one variable is 
leading or lagging in development. More technical details on LDS models can be found in Ferrer 
and McArdle (2004) and McArdle (2009). 
Analyses included both the mother-reported and observed measures of emotion control, along 
with the composites representing cognitive control, emotion understanding, and cognitive 
understanding. In all models, parameter estimates were obtained using full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010) and the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980), comparative fit index 
(CFI; Bentler, 1990), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMSR) were consulted to 
estimate the relative goodness of fit of the models. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the individual tasks and composites, as well 
as the correlations across time for individual tasks. Correlations within and across ages among 
the composite scores are shown in Table 2 along with the correlations with child age and 
language and partial correlations among the four processes controlling for 3-year language. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Measures and Composite Study Variables 
Variable 3 year 4 year r 
M SD Range N M SD Range N 
Emotion control–mother report 
 Falling reactivity 5.05 0.98 1.67–
6.83 
258 5.09 0.88 2.33–
7.00 
242 .56** 
 Lability/negativity (rev) 2.15 0.36 1.00–
2.94 
261 2.29 0.34   1–
3.07 
242 .64** 
 Emotion regulation 3.38 0.34 2.13–
4.00 
261 3.46 0.31 2.63–
4.00 
242 .54** 
 Composite 0.00 2.32     0.65 2.14     .68** 
Emotion control–observed 
 Verbal frustration (rev) 28.63 5.28 1–34 260 15.48 3.28  1–18 244 .21** 
 Physical frustration (rev) 13.06 2.09 1–14 260 4.88 0.46 1–5 244 .04 
 Global regulation 2.55 0.69 0–3 260 2.83 0.42 1–3 244 .10 
 Composite 0.00 2.29     2.98 0.98     .18** 
Cognitive control 
 K–ABC number recall 2.73 2.49 0–10 260 5.17 2.48 0–12 244 .51** 
 Stroop 6.58 5.46 0–16 260 10.01 4.25 0–16 243 .39** 
 Composite 0.00 1.68     1.65 1.41     .54** 
Emotion understanding 
 Labeling of emotions 11.84 3.40 0–16 261 14.40 1.75 5–16 244 .51** 
 Affective perspective 
taking 
12.19 4.39 0–20 258 16.77 3.15 4–20 244 .42** 
 Knowledge of emotion 
causes 
3.41 2.73 0–12 262 6.80 3.76 0–15 244 .51** 
 Composite 0.00 2.40     3.04 2.03     .65** 
Cognitive understanding 
 Appearance-reality 0.99 1.09 0–6 261 2.25 1.83 0–6 242 .27** 
 Visual perspective taking 1.69 1.70 0–7 258 3.28 2.35 0–7 243 .35** 
 Unexpected contents 1.12 1.28 0–4 261 1.70 1.64 0–4 244 .21** 
 Unexpected location 0.58 1.04 0–4 261 2.16 1.61 0–4 244 .34** 
 Composite 0.00 2.35     4.06 4.33     .46** 
Note. K–ABC = Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children; Stroop = day/night Stroop test; 
rev = reverse scored. 
**p ≤ .01. 
 
Table 2. Correlations for Study Variables (Ns = 242 to 262) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Emotion 
control–M 
report 3 year 
—                     
2. Emotion 
control–
observed 
3 year 
−.02 
(−.03) 
—                   
3. Cognitive 
control 3 year 
.10 
(.03) 
.10 
(.10) 
—                 
4. Emotion 
understandin
g 3 year 
.21** 
(.12) 
.10 
(.12*) 
.53** 
(.36**
) 
—               
5. Cognitive 
understandin
g 3 year 
.11 
(.05) 
−.07 
(−.09) 
.27** 
(.13) 
.32** 
(.09) 
—             
6. Emotion 
control–M 
report 4 year 
.68** 
(.67**
) 
.11 
(.10) 
.08 
(.01) 
.14* 
(−.03) 
.09 
(.03) 
—           
7. Emotion 
control–
observed 
4 year 
.15 * 
(.15*) 
.18** 
(.17**
) 
.13 
(.13*) 
.05 
(.05) 
−.01 
(−.02) 
.17* —         
8. Cognitive 
control 4 year 
.28** 
(.23**
) 
.06 
(.06) 
.54** 
(.44**
) 
.46** 
(.26**
) 
.31** 
(.19*) 
.21** 
(.15*
) 
.19* 
(.20**
) 
—       
9. Emotion 
understandin
g 4 year 
.12 
(.02) 
.13* 
(.15*) 
.40** 
(.22**
) 
.65** 
(.44**
) 
.27** 
(.08) 
.13 
(.04) 
.16* 
(.18**
) 
.40** 
(.21**
) 
—     
10. Cognitive 
understandin
g 4 year 
.19** 
(.12*) 
.07 
(.07) 
.42** 
(.27**
) 
.47** 
(.23**
) 
.46** 
(.34**
) 
.19** 
(.13) 
.05 
(.04) 
.50** 
(.38**
) 
.40** 
(.19**
) 
—   
11. Age 
3 year 
−.22** .02 .13* .14* −.02 −.05 .00 .03 .15* .01 — 
12. PPVT 
3 year 
.18** .02 .43** .69** .37** .17** .02 .43** .56** .47*
* 
.14
* 
Note. Partial correlations controlling for 3-year PPVT are in parentheses. 
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. 
 
Initially, models were tested that included and excluded the covariates of child age and language. 
Models with age and language fit significantly worse than those excluding age and language 
(e.g., fit for the model that included both child age and language was: RMSEA = .22, 
χ2 = 205, df = 15, CFI = .65). The relatively poor fits indicate that child age and language are not 
contributing to our understanding of change in the emotion and cognitive processes over time. 
Therefore, results are presented for the models excluding child age and language as direct 
predictors of change in the four processes over time. 
The aims of the present research were addressed by fitting four multivariate LDS regression 
models. Model 1, depicted in Figure 1, was a full multivariate model, including all dynamic 
relations among the four processes. That is, the model tests whether initial levels of each control 
and understanding process at 3 years predict change in itself and in the other three processes, 
with mother reported and observed emotion control both included in the model. The solid lines 
in Figure 1 represent coupling parameters (γ), the dotted lines represent the auto-proportion or 
self-feedback parameters (β), and intercepts are represented by the triangle. For each variable, 
estimates were obtained for the initial deviation, slope (change score), intercept and deviation, 
auto-proportion, and couplings with each of the other variables. 
 
Figure 1.  Dynamics of a multivariate emotion–cognition system. Note. ECM = emotion 
control–mother report; ECO = emotion control–observed; EU = emotion understanding; 
CC = cognitive control; CU = cognitive understanding. EC3 = scores at 3.5 years; 
ΔECM = yearly changes in ECM; triangle = constant = 1; path from constant to change = slope 
intercept; ECM0 = variance of initial scores; ECMs = variance of slope scores. Solid lines 
represent coupling parameters (γ); dotted lines represent auto-proportion or self-feedback 
parameters (β). Correlations among the 3-year processes and among the difference scores are 
estimated but not shown. 
The full dynamics model fit the data well (χ2 = .01, df = 5, RMSEA = .00). Parameter estimates 
for this model are presented in Table 3. All auto proportion parameters (β) were significant and 
negative, indicating that initial levels of all processes influenced yearly changes in themselves; 
children with higher initial levels showed less change over time. 
Table 3. Parameter Estimates for Full Dynamics Model 
Parameter ΔEmotion 
control–
mother 
report 
ΔEmotion 
control–
observed 
ΔCognitive 
control 
ΔEmotion 
understanding 
ΔCognitive 
understanding 
Loading α = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 
Proportion β −.36** −.93** −.66** −.50** −.47** 
Coupling γ 
 3 year emotion 
control-mother-
report→ 
— .07* .13** −.01 .18 
 3 year emotion 
control-
observed→ 
.12** — .00 .05 .09 
 3 year cognitive 
control→ 
.03 .09 — .08 .46** 
 3 year emotion 
understanding→ 
− .02 −.03 .10** — .44* 
 3 year cognitive 
understanding→ 
.02 −.01 .07* .04 — 
Initial mean = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 
Slope intercept .62** 2.97** 1.62** 3.00** 3.98** 
Initial variance 5.35** 5.23** 2.82** 5.78** 6.40** 
Slope variance 2.42** .82** 1.20** 2.36** 12.15** 
Note. All parameters are raw maximum-likelihood estimates fitted using Mplus. Correlations 
among levels and slopes are estimated but not shown here. 
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. 
 
Of primary interest was the extent to which each of the processes influenced growth and change 
in the others over and above the influence of a process on itself. The coupling parameters (γ) in 
the full multivariate model indicate that growth in cognitive processes, but not emotion 
processes, is predicted by age 3 scores on the other components of the model. For 
example, Table 3 shows that, holding initial values for all composites constant, children can be 
expected to increase 1.62 units in cognitive control from age 3 to age 4. This increase is 
accelerated by mother-reported emotion control, emotion understanding, and cognitive 
understanding scores at age 3 (significant coefficients of .13, .10, and .07, respectively). That is, 
children with better mother-reported emotion control, emotion understanding, and cognitive 
understanding at age 3 made greater gains in cognitive control between age 3 and 4 than other 
children. Likewise, cognitive understanding increased by an average of 3.98 units from age 3 to 
age 4, and this change was accelerated by cognitive control and emotion understanding scores at 
age 3 (coefficients of .46 and .44, respectively). Growth in emotion understanding was not 
predicted by any of the other processes. 
Considering the results from the perspective of which processes are leading indicators, that is, 
which processes influence change in others, mother-reported emotion control, cognitive control, 
emotion understanding, and cognitive understanding all appear to contribute to some extent to 
change in other processes. Mother-reported emotion control predicts growth in cognitive control 
but not in emotion or cognitive understanding, cognitive control predicts cognitive 
understanding, emotion understanding predicts cognitive control and cognitive understanding, 
and cognitive understanding predicts cognitive control. Behaviorally observed emotion control 
was only found to predict changes in itself and mother-reported emotion control; these two 
approaches to the measurement of regulation are clearly differentially related to cognitive 
development. 
Next, we conducted more rigorous tests of the dynamics among the four processes by comparing 
the fit of the full multivariate model with more parsimonious models specifying various 
processes as leading indicators, lagging indicators, or neither leading nor lagging indicators. We 
examined three additional sets of models, illustrated in Figure 2. These additional models were 
exploratory in nature. 
 
Figure 2.  (a) Emotion control–mother report as the only leading indicator of development in 
emotion and cognitive processes. (b) Development of emotion control–mother report is 
independent of the other processes. (c) emotion control–mother report as the only process that 
does not influence development in the other processes. 
In the first of these additional models, we examined whether any one of the processes is the only 
leading indicator of development in the other three processes. In these models, the coupling 
parameters (crossed coefficients) associated with only one predictor variable were estimated and 
all other coupling parameters were fixed at zero. Figure 2a illustrates a sample model with 
mother-reported emotion control as the only leading indicator of development in each of the 
other three processes. Each model was evaluated by comparing the chi-square fit index with the 
chi-square fit for the full dynamics model. As can be seen in Table 4, all five models produced 
significantly poorer fits in comparison to the full model, indicating that none of the processes is 
solely acting to accelerate development in the others. 
Table 4. Model Fits 
Model RMSEA CFI SRMSR Δχ2/Δdf 
Full dynamics .00 1.00 .00 .00/5 
One factor is the only leading indicator 
 Emotion control–mother report .10 .91 .08 71.37/16** 
 Emotion control–observed .11 .88 .10 87.70/16** 
 Cognitive control .09 .92 .07 61.82/16** 
 Emotion understanding .07 .95 .05 47.22/16** 
 Cognitive understanding .11 .89 .09 82.44/16** 
One factor is not lagging 
 Emotion control–mother report .00 1.00 .02 7.30/4 
 Emotion control–observed .00 1.00 .03 8.65/4 
 Cognitive control .11 .95 .05 35.46/4** 
 Emotion understanding .00 1.00 .01 3.67/4 
 Cognitive understanding .13 .93 .07 49.23/4** 
One factor is not leading 
 Emotion control–mother report .07 .98 .04 19.76/4** 
 Emotion control–observed .00 1.00 .02 8.04/4 
 Cognitive control .04 .99 .02 12.53/4* 
 Emotion understanding .06 .98 .03 18.58/4** 
 Cognitive understanding .00 1.00 .02 6.50/4 
Note. RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; 
SRMSR = standardized root mean square residual. All fit comparisons are in relation to the full 
dynamics model.*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. 
The next set of models (Figure 2b) examined “lagging hypotheses,” or whether one process is 
not developmentally influenced by any of the others. In these models, the coupling parameters 
associated with the prediction of one of the processes were fixed at zero (e.g.,Figure 2b depicts 
the model in which development of mother-reported emotion control is predicted only by initial 
values of itself and is independent of the other processes). If the fit of the model is similar to that 
of the full dynamics model, then we can say that change in the process of interest is not related to 
earlier performance in any of the other processes. 
Results, shown in Table 4, indicated that the models in which yearly changes in cognitive control 
and cognitive understanding are predicted only from their own initial levels resulted in 
significantly worse fits than the full model. These results suggest that cognitive control and 
cognitive understanding are dynamically dependent on the other processes. This was not true for 
mother-reported emotion control, observed emotion control, or emotion understanding, which 
appear to be changing independently of the other processes. 
The third set of comparison models tested whether any one process does not play a role in the 
development of any of the other processes (e.g., the sample model depicted in Figure 2c tests 
whether mother-reported emotion control is the only process that does not influence development 
in the other processes). In these models, the crossed coefficients for only one of the processes 
were fixed at zero while coupling parameters for the remaining three processes were estimated. 
If the fit of these models is similar to that for the full model, we can conclude that the variable 
with fixed coupling parameters does not influence the other variables in development. As shown 
in Table 4, the models for mother-reported emotion control, cognitive control, and emotion 
understanding fit significantly worse than the full model, indicating that there are dynamic 
relations between these processes and the others. The fits of the models for behaviorally 
observed emotion control and cognitive understanding were similar to that of the full model. 
Thus, observed emotion control and cognitive understanding at age 3 are not robust predictors of 
change from age 3 to 4 in any of the other processes. 
Overall Summary 
Based on the pattern of results from the sets of model comparisons in conjunction with the 
parameter estimates from the full dynamics model, our results indicate that: (a) no one process is 
accounting for change in all the others, and (b) cognitive control and cognitive understanding are 
dynamically dependent on each other, on emotion understanding, and on emotion control as 
reported by mothers, whereas emotion control and emotion understanding are independent. 
Discussion 
In the present research, we focus on two basic processes—control and understanding—that can 
be identified in the early development of both emotional and cognitive abilities. Our exploratory 
examination of the dynamic associations between and among emotion control, cognitive control, 
emotion understanding, and cognitive understanding indicate that these four processes are 
dynamically dependent. Specifically, growth in cognitive control and cognitive understanding 
appear to be dependent on each other and on emotion understanding. In addition, emotion control 
as reported by mothers supports growth in cognitive control, but emotion control as measured 
behaviorally in frustrating lab tasks is not related to growth in other processes. Growth in 
emotion processes is not predicted by initial levels of any of the other processes. 
The early development of emotion control skills and their relation to cognitive processes has 
been the focus of considerable research. Investigators have tended to adopt one of two positions, 
with some claiming that emotion control abilities support cognitive development (Blair & 
Diamond, 2008) and others claiming that cognitive advances make it possible for children to 
monitor and control their behavior (Carlson & Wang, 2007; Perner & Lang, 1999). The results of 
the present study suggest that emotion control as measured by mother report and emotion 
understanding underlie advances in both cognitive control and cognitive understanding during 
the preschool years. 
Gains in both cognitive control and cognitive understanding were partially accounted for by 
levels of these factors at age 3. These results support those of others (see Moses & Tahiroglu, 
2010, for a review) who have shown executive function skills to predict mental state 
understanding. In the present study, mental state understanding also appeared to support the 
development of executive function skills, as has been proposed by Perner (1998). Our results 
suggest that the effect of cognitive understanding on changes in cognitive control may not be as 
strong as the effect of cognitive control on cognitive understanding. We did not find evidence 
that either cognitive control or cognitive understanding were key factors driving development of 
emotion processes. Because we elected to measure emotional and cognitive processes at about 
the earliest age children can reliably complete tasks to measure cognitive control and both 
emotion and cognitive understanding, our results cannot be generalized beyond the early 
preschool period. Our findings suggest interrelations across the domains of emotion and 
cognition, as has been suggested by others. As children grow and their cognitive control skills 
become more sophisticated, cognitive processes undoubtedly become more important to the 
scaffolding and organization of learning. Furthermore, processes of understanding can feed back 
into control skills. The present study is therefore only a starting point for researchers to examine 
the dynamic interplay among these four domains of development. 
Our framework of dividing skills across domains into indices of control and indices 
of understanding adds a new dimension to past work in which emotional development and 
cognitive development have typically been studied separately, and similarities in processes have 
not been clarified. This is particularly true for control processes, which are commonly labeled 
emotion regulation in the social-emotional literature and executive function in the cognitive 
literature. Increasingly, investigators have noted the overlap in definitions of these constructs 
(e.g., Calkins & Bell, 2010; Liebermann et al., 2007). Attentional control, inhibitory control, and 
self-regulation are difficult to separate and are often needed within the same tasks. 
Another key issue involves the measurement of processes of control and understanding. 
Measures of cognitive control are perhaps most well developed and standardized (Garon, 
Bryson, & Smith, 2008) although there continue to be differences of opinion about the 
components of executive function (e.g., Zelazo, Carlson, & Kesek, 2008). By contrast, 
measurement issues in the study of emotion control continue to be widely discussed and debated 
(e.g., Zeman, Klimes-Dougan, Cassano, & Adrian, 2007). Emotion control is most often 
measured using parent or teacher report to capture the child’s typical responses across a wide 
range of situations. Frustrating laboratory tasks have also been developed to allow direct 
observation of regulatory strategies. These approaches are limited in the range of intensity that 
can ethically be elicited and also because it is known that even very young children can hide 
negative emotions (Zeman et al., 2007), making it difficult to observe and code regulation 
accurately. In the present investigation, the global regulation measure had low reliability, which 
may have affected the results. 
We followed past studies in considering emotion understanding to include recognition of 
emotional expressions and knowledge of appropriate emotional displays in specific situations 
(Denham, 1998). Given the young age of the children in our study, we defined cognitive 
understanding as understanding of mental states and used perspective taking, appearance-reality, 
and theory of mind tasks as indicators. Some recent work suggests that children understand 
desires and variation in desires prior to understanding that people may hold differing beliefs 
(Wellman, Fang, & Peterson, 2011; Wellman & Liu, 2004); inclusion of tasks involving desires 
may have expanded the range of performance. Some investigators studying theory of mind 
consider understanding of emotions to be a component part of this construct (Ketelaars, van 
Weerdenburg, Verhoeven, Cuperus, & Jansonius, 2010; Pears & Moses, 2003) whereas others 
believe the dimensions are separable (Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, Zubernis, & Balaraman, 
2003; Cutting & Dunn, 1999). Some research indicates that different factors predict emotion and 
cognitive understanding as we define them (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 
1991), and these constructs also have been shown to relate to different outcomes (Dunn, 2000). 
Nevertheless, there are clear similarities between one’s understanding of others’ emotional states 
and of mental states. 
It is possible that the emotion understanding tasks we used were more straightforward than the 
cognitive understanding tasks and that this difference in complexity contributed to the 
developmental relations we identified. We expect that as children’s understanding of their own 
and others’ emotional and mental states develops into the early school years and beyond, there 
are reciprocal relations between these domains. Longer term longitudinal research is needed to 
disentangle these transactional relations over time. 
Prior research has examined some aspects of the relations between the processes considered in 
the present study, but no previous work has included all of them in a large and diverse sample of 
children studied longitudinally. The developmental dynamics approach allowed us to examine 
the contributions of all four processes to one another. This is a novel way to look at 
developmental change and offers the advantage that we are able to study the effects of the four 
processes simultaneously. A further advantage of the use of latent difference score models over 
traditional difference score analyses is that measurement error is taken into account, such that 
more reliable estimates of effects are obtained. 
An additional strength of the present research was the use of a multimethod approach to measure 
emotion control. The differences in our results from analyses using maternal report of emotion 
control compared with those using behavioral observation of emotion control suggest that 
laboratory observations are not tapping the same range of individual differences in emotion 
control as maternal report. Future research could take a multimethod developmental approach to 
the assessment of all four processes. Such an approach would allow us to better untangle the 
structural overlaps and distinctions among the processes and assess convergence and divergence 
in the dynamics among the four processes. 
Understanding the developmental dynamics among emotional and cognitive processes can 
enhance our understanding of the complex interplay across domains that are often investigated as 
if they were independent. Longer term longitudinal work that includes measures of both 
cognitive and emotional functioning assessed using different methodological approaches is likely 
to unravel more of the reciprocal relations among these processes. 
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